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Secularism, disregarding the existence of God and the supernatural,
renders temporal welfare and progress the ultimate human concerns.'
* Professor Emeritus, St. Louis University; A.B., Immaculate Heart College, 1932; M.A.,
University of California at Los Angeles, 1938; Ph.D., University of California at Los Angeles,
1940.
1 F. BAUMER, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF SCEPTIcISM 67 (1960); T. MOLNAR, CHRISTIAN Hu-
MANISM 65 (1978). Humanism is a man-centered ideology whereby the measure of the rela-
tive worth of values, ideals, and concepts is entirely based upon secular considerations as
seen from the individual's point of view. T. MOLNAR, supra, at 65. Humanism espouses "the
glorification of man as a potentially absolute being, implicitly in no need of God." Id. at
125-26. The humanists, therefore, proclaim that religions which place God above man do a
disservice to the human species. See B. MORRIS, WHY ARE You LOSING YOUR CHILDREN? 9
(1976). Since ethics, values and mores are considered autonomous and situational, they re-
quire no theological or ideological sanction. Id. The "good life, here and now," becomes the
ultimate goal. Id. This is in direct contrast with traditional faiths that value and emphasize
the afterlife, as prophesied in the beatitudes. See generally Matthew 5:3-12. "Secularism"
or "humanism" involves a rejection of traditional religion, a worldwide desacralisation, and
a transposition of thought and belief from the religious to the irreligious realm. C. CAMP-
BELL, TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF IRRELIGION 6 (1971) (citing Shiner, The Concept of Seculari-
zation in Empirical Research, in JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 2 (1967)).
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Under the name "humanism," or, more precisely, "secular humanism,"
this system of beliefs has become dominant in American public education
since it functions to fill the vacuum produced by the court-mandated ex-
clusion of traditional religious philosophies from American public
schools.' Consequently, by exclusively supporting public education the
content of which is entirely secular, government in the United States in-
culcates secularism.
This Article proposes to investigate how secularism is inculcated
through the American public education system and to demonstrate how
exclusive governmental support of such a system is unconstitutional. The
inescapable conclusion of this study is that in order to observe the Con-
stitution and to respect natural human rights, the government not only
must subsidize education that inculcates secularism, but also must aid
education, the subject matter of which is secular as well as traditionally
religious.
AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE PREEMINENCE AND INCULCATION OF
SECULARISM
Education inculcates values in the young and impressionable.3
Teachers are mature, self-confident individuals, holding magisterial posi-
tions, whereas students are relatively immature, insecure and in the hum-
ble position of learners. As such, the individual student, usually pliable
and receptive, is subjected to the infusion of ideas, constantly absorbing
them from several sources: teachers, fellow students, curriculum and
Today, the ultimate political and educational aim of the humanist movement is to secularize
society completely. Id. at 7.
' Court cases concerning the teaching of religious principles or the introduction of dogma in
the public school system have "mandate[d] governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Naturally, the public's right
to receive information from the government via schools must be balanced with the first
amendment freedom to propagate religious beliefs. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636
F.2d 738, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Crowley, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
defendant institution's evolution exhibit did not constitute an establishment of secular hu-
manism as a religion. Id. at 741. Judge Oberdorfer took judicial notice of the fact that secu-
lar humanism advocates evolution, the right to divorce, birth control, and universal educa-
tion, among other causes. Id. at 740 n.3. Secular humanism, and its attendant philosophies,
are promoted in the United States by various organizations such as the American Humanist
Association, the Ethical Society, the Fellowship of Religious Humanists, Planned
Parenthood, the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States, and many
members of the Unitarian Church.
3 The definitions of education and inculcation are necessarily intertwined since the meaning
of inculate is "to impress by repeated statement or admonition; teach persistently and ear-
nestly" and "to cause or influence (someone) to accept an idea or feeling." THE RANDOM
HousE DICTIONARY 722 (1981) (emphasis added).
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school-related activities. Some of these influences are positive and ex-
plicit, while others are negative and subtle.
Positive Inculcation
Many values are communicated positively in public schools. Among
these are several moral virtues considered essential for the maintenance
of an orderly, tranquil academic atmosphere. For example, students are
taught self control, a sense of justice, temperance, sympathy, charity, in-
dustry and perseverance, and respect for and obedience to duly consti-
tuted authority. Certain virtues concerning citizenship also are imparted
to students, including respect for democracy, patriotism, racial equality,
and community spirit. To fulfill its essential purpose, a public school
must impart these values as well as convey effectively specific course ma-
terial. Dedicated teachers do not limit their instruction to these minimum
essentials, but, also attempt to convey the ultimate principles that under-
lie values. Thus, a teacher may explain that freedom and equality, which
are essential elements of a democratic state, ultimately depend upon spir-
itual worth, moral dignity, and the final destiny of every human being.4
In addition to such instruction, many teachers endeavor to convey
their own value systems5 and seek to "rectify" the existing values and life
attitudes of their students. Frequently, they believe that the students'
perceptions, which were learned elsewhere, are old-fashioned and
outmoded, and that they cause unnecessary inhibitions and complexes.6
" See J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 119-27 (1951). The noted philosopher, Jacques Mar-
itain, states:
[I]t would be sheer illusion to think that the democratic charter could be efficiently
taught if it were separated from the roots that give it consistence and vigor in the
mind of each one. . . . [T]herefore [teachers must] explain and justify [the demo-
cratic charter] in the light of the philosophical or religious faith to which they cling
and which quickens their belief.
Id. at 121. Similarly, Father Raymond Nogar, professor of philosophy, asserts that while
humanism began as a response to the inadequacies of traditional religion, there still exist
valid, basic doctrines in nonsecular beliefs, which retain their relevance to man's life in the
developmental world. Nogar, "Evolutionary Humanism and the Faith," in Is GOD DEAD?
54-55 (1966).
6 Ed Doerr, an indefatigable opponent of public aid to church-related education, admits
that the public schools, and teachers and courses therein, often inculcate moral and spiritual
values hostile to those of students and parents. Doerr, Editorial, 30 CHURCH & STATE 5
(May 1977). He is forced to acknowledge grudingly that "there is evidence that some teach-
ers, courses, and schools stray from the religious neutrality required by the pluralistic na-
ture of our society and the Constitution in the direction of the major faiths of the local
communities." Id.; see supra note 2.
6 One way in which the attitudes and concepts of secular humanism are inculcated in stu-
dents is through the literature selected by the teacher. See B. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 40-
44; B. MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
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Convinced that reason rather than faith should be the supreme arbiter,
many teachers attempt to liberate their students from the antiquated
taboos with which they have been indoctrinated by their parents and reli-
gious institutions. More and more, public schoolteachers are encouraged
to act as mental hygienists, psychiatric clinicians and social engineers,
"rehabilitating" individuals and "rebuilding" society for the future. A re-
port of the National Education Society of the United States has predicted
that "[s]chools will become clinics whose purpose is to provide individual-
ized psycho-social treatment for the students, and teachers must become
psycho-therapists.
' '1
Contemporary educational theory and literature often conceive of the
teacher as an agent for revolutionary change in the attitudes, standards
and moral views of students, and thus, eventually, those of the commu-
nity at large. This change is toward more liberal and less inhibited con-
cepts and norms.8 Some scholars describe instructors as "unafraid to
B. MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM]; cf. L. BERMAN, NEW PRIORITIES IN THE CURRICU-
LUM 76 (1968) (personal relationships may be fostered by careful selection of literature, par-
ticularly in the sex education area). Much of this literature concerns deviations from tradi-
tional social norms regarding morality and sexuality, and directly or indirectly inculcates a
"more liberal" and "less conventional" attitude toward possible life choices. See Schwartz,
Adolescent Literature: Humanism is Alive and Thriving in the Secondary School, 36 THE
HUMANIST 37-38 (Jan.-Feb. 1976). The indoctrination of students in public schools also in-
cludes the implantation of specific political views. See Lightfoot, Politics and Reasoning:
Through the Eyes of Teachers and Children, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 197, 197-98 (1973) ("[tlhe
teacher's belief systems and value orientations penetrate the classroom environment and are
communicated to children"); see also Jennings, Langton & Niemi, Effects of the High
School Civics Curriculum, in THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ADOLESCENCE 187-90 (1974)
(high school civics courses emphasize the study of various political institutions); Ehman,
Jennings & Niemi, Social Studies Teachers and Their Pupils, in THE POLITICAL CHARACTER
OF ADOLESCENCE 211-14 (1974) (teachers are disseminators of political values and skills and
they impart cultural norms with political overtones).
' Abrigg, In the Name of Education, in 10 PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REPORT 3 (Dec. 1976); see B.
MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM, supra note 6, at 4-10. Barbara Morris, a nationally
recognized authority on the philosophy of modern education, postulates that teachers con-
sciously and purposely encourage students to discard the values that they have brought to
school with them in order that the school may more easily fulfill its role to "change, create
and clarify" their pupils' values. B. MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM, supra note 6, at 4
(footnote omitted). The goal of secular education is to eradicate old-fashioned mores fos-
tered by puritanical orthodox religions. See id. at 5. She concludes that due to the liberal,
autonomous and irreligious education, unmanageable and disrespectful school-age people re-
sult. Id. at 6-7. Furthermore, in light of their multi-faceted roles, ranging from educators to
therapists, it appears inconsistent that teachers ignore the basic and fundamental influence
that religion has played in defining morality, especially since such instruction can occur in
an objective, nonsectarian, informational, and historical context. See generally C. Cox, THE
FOURTH R-WHAT CAN BE TAUGHT ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PUaLIC SCHOOLS 127-55 (1969); V.
THAYER, RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 109-22 (1947).
6 George D. Spindler states that the core values in American culture are changing, and that
teachers should be receptive to the new "emergent values," which are supplanting the
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challenge old, time-honored ideas." Similarly, William C. Bower per-
ceives the school as "a laboratory into which the experiences in the school
itself, in the family and in the community are brought for analysis, ap-
praisal, and redirection in light of the moral and spiritual insights of
mankind." 10 Accordingly, Professor Jules Henry believes that "[t]he ele-
mentary school classroom does . . . not merely sustain attitudes which
have been created in the home, but reinforces some, deemphasizes others,
and makes its own contribution."'"
Such positive inculcation has been enhanced recently by an emphasis
upon "values clarification" and "values development." In the context of
these types of courses and a wide variety of others, such as social studies,
"traditional values" in our country. Spindler, Education in a Transforming American Cul-
ture, 25 HARv. ED. REV. 145, 148-49 (1955). Spindler categorizes as traditional values puri-
tan morality, work-success ethic, individualism, achievement orientation and future-time
orientation. Id. Emergent values, on the other hand, include sociability, relativistic moral
attitudes, consideration for others, hedonistic, present-time orientation and conformity to
the group. Id.
Sex educators are among those who seek sweeping changes in American values. See B.
MORRIS, THE RELIGOON oF HUMANISM, supra note 6, at 5. Morris states that sex educators
are moving away from teaching sex from a moral point of view and are instead teaching sex
from a hedonistic, pleasure-oriented perspective. Id. She asserts that such an emphasis has
contributed to "a scorn [of] Christian standards of morality, [and the proliferation of] open
homosexuality, rampant VD and untold numbers of abortions." Id.; see C. BRAUNER & H.
BURNS, PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHY 73-77 (1965). For an in-depth exploration
of the power struggle between parents and teachers regarding the proper subject matter in
public schools, see M. FANTINI, WHAT'S BEST FOR THE CHILDREN? 159-201 (1974) (advocating
co-operation between parents and educators in the implementation of educational
priorities).
* C. BECK, N. BERNIER, J. MACDONALD, T. WALTON & J. WILEpS, EDUCATION FOR RELE-
VANCE 240 (1968). Barbara Morris believes that the zeal to confront traditional values leads
to conflict between schools and parents. B. MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM, supra note
6, at 3. She states that "[miany young teachers, thoroughly indoctrinated into Humanism
have a missionary zeal that would put so-called Christians to shame." Id.; see supra note 8.
'0 W. BOWER, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN EDUCATION 82 (1952). Dewey states, "The
business of the educator-whether parent or teacher-is to see to it that the greatest possi-
ble number of ideas . . . are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving
ideas.. . ." J. DEWEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION 2 (1959) (emphasis in original).
School activities must be judged by their moral significance in forming and correcting habits
tending to contribute to society's well-being. Id. at 13-15.
,1 Henry, Attitude Organization in Elementary School Classrooms, 27 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHI-
ATRY 117, 117 (1957); see E. LEACOCK, TEACHING AND LEARNING IN CITY SCHOOLS, at xi
(1969). Eleanor Burke Leacock, a professor of anthropology, comments that the school is an
instrument used to accomplish the dual goals of shaping the student and fostering aspects of
his development. E. LEACOCK, supra, at xi. Thus, a new role for teachers evolves. Id. Fur-
thermore, practically everything that the teacher does, whether explicit or implicit, either
will reinforce or reject the perceived value of a particular behavior. Id. at 59-61. Conse-
quently, the depth and variety in the planned classroom curriculum will naturally expose
the student to widely divergent sources of input. See id. at 33-34.
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history, current events, literature, health, hygiene, home economics and
family living, typically a question is posed, diverse alternatives are sug-
gested and considered, and the problem is freely discussed.' " Arguments
and factors of various types-with the exception of religious considera-
tions-are raised and analyzed, and both individual and group solutions
are arrived at on a wholly secular basis. Values discussions also may occur
in other contexts. In addition to general, open-ended discussion of social
and individual problems, there are debates and panels, future-planning
games,'8 and "survival" problems. " Courses in current events and com-
parative cultures are also forums for values discussions. Among the issues
discussed by students are the pro-abortion and anti-pornography deci-
sions of the courts, the dilemmas of doctors and relatives concerning the
survival of those unconscious or suffering with no hope of recovery, the
rights of homosexuals, and the proper legal status of drugs such as mari-
juana. These discussions also may focus upon such issues as "Construct-
ing a Life Philosophy," "The Sexual Revolution," "Problems of Death,"
and "American Values." By surrounding the student with purely secular
subject matter, the public school system takes affirmative steps to create
a wholly secular atmosphere and ultimately to indoctrinate students with
secular principles. Indeed, since various moral philosophies are submitted
for free and open discussion, and alternatives are given equal status when
presented, the impression conveyed is that there is no definite, perma-
nent, fundamental moral law. All alternatives are put on an equal plane,
as though one might choose any of them without error or blame, and as if
they simply were a matter of free individual choice.'5 The whole process
involves an assumption that individual human reason can establish and
disestablish morality, and invites an independent establishment of
lifeguiding principles and values. It also tends to substitute the value
" B. MORRIS, THE RELIGION OF HUMANISM, supra note 6, at 3.
,s Id. at 8-9. Future-planning games are conducted on a wide spectrum of topics such as
"Tommorrow's Society," "Changing Family Sexual Roles and Concepts," and "The Chang-
ing Role of Religion." An emphasis on liberalism is inherent in these scenarios.
" Id. at 9-10. Survival problems involve questions whether certain persons should be "ex-
terminated" when the survival of all in a particular crisis is improbable. Id. at 9. An exam-
ple of such a situation is the dilemma faced during a potential nuclear bombing when there
exists only limited space and rations in a shelter. Id. Morris maintains that exercises in
survival problems coupled with the humanist belief in the right to abortion, suicide, and
euthanasia, contribute to a utilitarian view of life which leads to a lessening of respect for
the worth of others' rights to exist. Id.
"' John S. Stewart claims that values education is deceptively and dangerously superficial.
Stewart, Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique, 56 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 684, 684-87
(1975); see Lockwood, A Critical View of Values Clarification, 77 TEACHERS COLLEGE REc-
ORD 35 (Sept. 1975). Lockwood makes the same observation when he states that values clari-
fication holds all values to be equally valid. As a result, no one opinion is better than any
other, and therefore any activity can be justified. Lockwood, supra, at 46-47.
SECULARISTIC EDUCATION
judgments of the majority of students or those of the teacher for those of
parents and traditional religion.
Negative Inculcation
Perhaps more pervasive and influential than affirmative impartation
of secularist values is negative inculcation of such values." Although the
aforementioned general discussions may have no predetermined or
teacher-dictated solutions, they portray certain moral systems as relevant,
thus implicitly suggesting that others are not. The views and principles of
traditional religion are excluded rigorously from discussions in our public
schools, while those of the secular "isms" that challenge and negate tradi-
tional religion and religion-based morality are given full play and respect-
ful consideration. It is by. this exclusion of traditional religious principles,-
and morals from consideration that the public-education process in effect
denies the existence of God and the validity of traditional religion. If a
parent were to avoid all reference to religion and religion-based morality
in rearing his children, and were to omit any reference to religious consid-
erations in discussing fundamental questions of human life with them, a
reasonable conclusion would be that, implicitly, the existence or at least
the validity of God and religion was being denied. The exclusively secular
public school system accomplishes the very same result-it endorses the
assumption that traditional religious values are irrelevant, unrealistic and
illusory, implanting in students habits of secularistic thought and
decisionmaking.
' Secularism or secular humanism is essentially negative, rather than positive. It is an ab-
sence rather than a presence, a negation rather than an affirmation. See H. Cox, THE SECU-
LAR CrrY 18 (1966). Secularism is satisfied with the omission of any reference to anything
beyond the natural world, and achieves its purpose when supernatural concerns simply are
excluded from consideration, as is the case of American public education. See AmRCAN
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ON RELIGION AND EDUCATION, THE RELATION OF RELI-
GION TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 4 (N. Brown ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as RELATION OF RELi-
GION TO PUBLIC EDUCATION] (it is the essence of secularism to render traditional religion
innocuous by isolating it from practical affairs); AMERICAN COUNCEL ON EDUCATION, COMMIrr-
TEE ON RELIGION AND EDUCATION, THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7-8, 13-14
(N. Brown ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS].
Professor Robert J. Henle, S.J., maintains, however, that what is negative secularism in
government becomes positive secularism when it is applied to publicly supported education.
Henle, Dilemmas of the Prayer Decision, 13 SOCIAL ORDER 32, 46 (Mar. 1963). Father Henle
observes that "education, reduced by negation and exclusion to secularism, must become, in
fact, positively secular." He explains that "as soon as government enters those areas of con-
crete activity wherein religion is an important immanent factor, the effort to maintain the
negative secularism of government becomes an effort to secularize society positively.
Id. at 46-47.
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Secularism as the Truly Preeminent Force in American Public
Education
Many supporters of public education lament the absence of religious
instruction in the public schools. Virgil Henry, after describing the sev-
eral aspects of life to which children are introduced and adapted in public
schools, notes: "For religion, however, the school has a blind spot....
The school does not know that there is such a thing as religion in Ameri-
can society. 1 7 The ultimate result of the exclusion of religion from edu-
cation was predicted in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the
renowned Protestant theologian, Archibald Alexander Hodge. He stated
that "[t]he atheistic doctrine is gaining currency, even among professed
Christians and even among some bewildered Christian ministers, that an
education provided by the common government for the children of di-
verse religious parties should be entirely emptied of all religious charac-
ter."1 s Hodge observed accurately that an exclusion of religion from edu-
cation would result finally in the extirpation of religion from American
society and the triumph of atheism. 9
Sixty years after the publication of Hodge's prophesy, the American
Council on Education (the Council) attested to its accuracy. Criticizing
the exclusion of religion from public education, the Council declared:
As time passes, the inconsistency of excluding the study of religion becomes
more, rather than less, marked. The school itself is emphasizing a division, a
split, in the educative process which its own philosophy increasingly repudi-
ates. To avoid this contradiction, one must either accept the patent infer-
ence that religious education is relatively unimportant, and a marginal in-
terest, or assume that religion is a matter so remote from life that it admits
of no integration with the general educational program. 0
Eleven years later, the Council issued another report, reiterating and fur-
17 V. HENRY, THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (1950); see C. Cox, supra note
7, at 1-12.
'1 A. HODGE, POPULAR LECTURES ON THEOLOGICAL THEMES 280 (1887).
1' Professor Hodge noted that the universe must be conceived of either in theistic or atheis-
tic terms, and that atheism taught in schools cannot be counteracted by theism taught in
religious institutions. Id. at 281-83. Professor Hodge perceived the natural result of public
education that exclusively inculcates secularism as being anti-Christian and anti-social ni-
hilism. Id. at 283-84. He postulated that theories similar to humanism, such as atheism,
dualism, polytheism, deism, idealism, materialism, and pantheism, all stem from an attempt
to deny the existence of God as the one omnipotent, omnipresent Being. See A. HODGE,
OUTLINES O THEOLOGY 46-52 (1972).
" RELATION OF RELIGION TO PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 16, at 10. The American Council
on Education (the Council) notes that contact with religious life is less frequent due to
secularism. The Council attributes religious ignorance to this fact. Id. at 29. It further indi-
cates that religious leaders realize that their message is being stifled by the organized secu-
lar forces in society. Id. at 45.
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ther developing the points made in its initial study. The Council declared:
"Our primary concern is to oppose the artificial separation of the sacred
and the secular-the setting apart of religion from the common life."," As
an antidote, the study quoted the suggestion of the National Council of
Churches in the United States, which stated that "[in some constitu-
tional way, provision should be made for the inculcation of the principles
of religion, whether within or outside the precincts of the school, but al-
ways within the regular schedule of a pupil's working day.""2
In further testimony to the secularizing result of excluding tradi-
tional religion from education, Episcopal Bishop James A. Pike asserts
that the "exclusively secular" nature of American public education actu-
ally is antireligious rather than neutral in its impact.2 s - In agreement is
distinguished Law Professor Wilber G. Katz, who observes that "rigorous
exclusion of the subject of religion from a program of general education
would not be neutral; such exclusion would teach by implication the
unimportance of religion." 4 Katz further declares:
To teach moral values without teaching that many believe these values to
have religious roots is to predispose students toward secular humanism.
This is a serious problem, for recent studies of public education have re-
ported a more or less deliberate avoidance of religious subject matter, even
when it is clearly intrinsic to the discipline concerned.2"
There can be no doubt that our public schools, in their present form,
inculcate secularism, by excluding God and traditional religion and mo-
rality from evaluative estimates and decisions. Unfortunately, this influ-
ence ordinarily cannot be counteracted effectively by family or religion."6
I STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 16, at 8.
22 Id. at 16.
13 See Jones, Church-State Relations, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 156, 188 (H.
Stahmer ed. 1963). By recognizing secular humanism as a form of religion, albeit irreligious,
an argument may be presented that the secular content of American public education
should be counterbalanced by objective instruction in basic Judeo-Christian rationales. For
a thought-provoking discussion on the implementation of such a curriculum, see C. Cox,
supra note 7, at 127-55; J. DEWEY, supra note 10, at 19-28; V. THAYER, supra note 7, at 76-
100. A particularly practical proposal would introduce religious mores from a historical, cul-
tural, and textbook approach. C. Cox, supra note 7, at 142-55.
S4 W. KATZ, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 40 (1964). Katz contends that ob-
jective instruction concerning the religious underpinnings of our history should occur at va-
rious age levels so that students will learn the moral habits inherent to our democratic soci-
ety. Id.
5 Id. at 50. Christopher Dawson believes that wholly secular education has led to an uncon-
sciousness of spiritual values in the Western world. C. DAWSON, THE CRISIS OFl WESTERN
EDUCATION 203 (1961). He views this secular civilization as culturally inferior, since all other
civilizations have incorporated spiritual values into their educational systems. Id.
" McClusky, The New Secularity and the Requirements of Pluralism, in RELIGION AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION 243-46 (T. Sizer ed. 1967).
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As Charles Francis Potter observes:
Education is thus a most powerful ally of humanism, and every public
school is a school of humanism. What can the theistic Sunday school, meet-
ing for an hour once a week, and teaching only a fraction of the children, do
to stem the tide of a five-day program of humanistic teaching?27
EXCLUSIVE GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF SECULARISTIC EDUCATION
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The United States Supreme Court has declared repeatedly that any
government support or sponsorship of religion is contrary to the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. On this basis, the Court has
banned all governmental subsidization of private education, since it pri-
marily would benefit church-related schools that regularly include reli-
gious instruction along with the teaching of secular subjects.2 s Some ar-
gue, however, that, if this be the case, then exclusive governmental
support of public schools, which exclusively inculcate secular concepts,
secular values, and secular habits of thought and choice, also is
17 C. POTTER, HUMANISM: A NEw RELIION 128 (1930). Several prominent educators have
observed the dominance of secularism in the public school system. See, e.g., E. TowNs, HAvE
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS HAD IT? 101-04 (1974) ("[tlhe public schools have a singular adherence
to secular humanism ... without reference to or need of God .... The public school is no
longer neutral, it is anti-Christian"); Drinan, Can Public Funds be Constitutionally
Granted to Private Schools? 13 SOCIAL ORDER 18, 22 (March 1963); Illich, Commencement
of the University of Puerto Rico, 13 N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 12 (Oct. 9, 1969) ("[t]he school has
become the established Church of secular times"); Klewin, Make Way for the Christian
School, 70 LIBERTY 18 (1975) (public education is "trying to supplant rather than supple-
ment home education [and is] affirmatively opposing religion"); National Catholic Welfare
Conference, The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal
Aid to Education, 50 GEO. L.J. 397, 438-41 (1961) (exclusive attention to secular values
competes and detracts from the inculcation of religious values in students). The Catholic
Welfare Conference concludes that the United States Government cannot constitutionally
impose a single educational system upon the people, id. at 437, but that it must balance the
competing goals of expanding freedom, preserving both parents' and children's rights, and
promoting the nation's welfare, when implementing policies affecting education, id. at 442.
The Supreme Court has condemned government support of nonpublic education on the
premise that such promotion is violative of the first amendment's establishment and free
exercise clauses. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. In order to determine the consti-
tutionality of a statute under the establishment clause, the Court has set out a three-part
test. In order to be held constitutional the statute must have a secular purpose, its primary
effect "must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and the statute must not
foster "excessive government entanglement with religion." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40
(1980) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). In Stone, a Kentucky
statute required that a copy of the Ten Commandments be purchased with private contri-
butions and posted in public classrooms. 449 U.S. at 39. Applying the three-part test, the
Court held that the statute failed to meet the first part because the posting served no edu-
cational purpose, but merely induced religion. Id. at 42-43.
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unconstitutional.29
Secularism as "Religion" or "Irreligion"
Both humanists and critics of present-day government educational
policies observe that secularism or secular humanism is a "religion." The
first Humanist Manifesto explicitly defined secular humanism as a reli-
gion, 0 and early founders and leaders of the movement, including several
humanist authors, such as Sir Julian Huxley and Professor John Dewey,
agreed emphatically with this view.'" Notwithstanding that many modern
humanists prefer to call humanism a "philosophy of life" or simply a
"philosophy," ' "3 Corliss Lamont, humanism's leading contemporary expos-
itor, admits that humanism may be termed a religion as well as a philoso-
phy."3 Leo Pfeffer, an inveterate opponent of any share of educational tax
funds for church-related education, nonetheless concedes that nontheistic
beliefs, such as secular humanism, may be religious: "I shall regard hu-
manism as a religion along with the three major faiths: Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism. This, I submit, is not an unreasonable inclu-
sion. Ethical Culture is exclusively humanist but it is generally considered
a religion.' 4 Moreover, Theodore R. Sizer, affording religion a very broad
29 See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text; cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-
04 (1968) ("[tjhe First Amendment mandates neutrality ... between religion and nonreli-
gion"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (state cannot "pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can it aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs").
" HUMANIST MANIFESTO I & 11 (1976).
31 See J. DEWEY, A COMMON FITH 8-28 (1934); J. HuxLEY, RELIGION WITHOUT REVELATION
17-24 (1957). Julian Huxley, a twentieth-century philosopher and scientist, advocates hu-
manism as a religion. J. HuxLEY, supra, at 20. He describes religion as "a way of life." Id.
Huxley contends that the highest form of religion exists when there is an absence of a belief
in a supernatural god and a divine revelation. Id. at 1. Huxley views the primary purpose of
religion as the development and fulfillment of man as the controller of his own destiny. Id.
at 208.
Dewey, a philosophical predecessor of Huxley, notes that religions are divided into two
groups: those which are premised upon faith in a supernatural being and those which com-
pletely discredit traditional religion and the supernatural. J. DEWEY, supra, at 1-2. Dewey
contends that belief in a god impedes one's ability to be religious and that being truly reli-
gious is characterized by experience and a general attitude. Id. at 23.
32 See, e.g., C. LAMONT, FREEDOM Is AS FREEDOM DOES 216 (1981) (labelling humanism as an
"anti-supernaturalist philosophy").
C. LAMONT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM 23-25, 53-56 (6th ed. 1982). Lamont indicates
that features of humanism, including a oneness with nature and an integrated and inclusive
way of life, are common to both humanism and religion. Id. at 177-90.
- L. PFEFFER, CRE-DS IN COMPEIrTION 5 (1958). Pfeffer examines humanism along with the
theistic faiths and discusses their effects on life, values, and community issues. See gener-
ally id. He offers proof that humanism is a religion, claiming that it is allied in the "cultural
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1983
definition, observes: "One can construe 'religion' as a person's Weltan-
schauung, the way he sees reality and his place in it."3 The American
Council on Education also accepts a broad definition of religion, stating
that "[ifn simple terms religion implies an ultimate reality to which su-
preme allegiance must be given. '3 6 Undoubtedly, whatever secular hu-
manists prefer to call their belief and way of life, it constitutes a religion
as the term is regarded by contemporary, competent authorities.3 7
Furthermore, secular humanism falls under the rubric of religion as
the term has been construed judicially.38 The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that beliefs, principles, or values that hold a place in a person's
mind and life, similar to faith in God and Divine revelation for traditional
believers, are religious, and constitute a religion for purposes of the first
market" with the three major religions: Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Id. To-
day's humanism is derived from 18th-century deism which often is termed a religion. Id.
Additionally, Unitarianism and Universalism, both primarily humanist, are considered reli-
gions, while Ethical Culture is listed as a religion in the Yearbook of American Churches.
Id.
05 RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, at xvii (T. Sizer ed. 1967).
36 RELATION OF RELIGION TO PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 16, at 26.
37 See, e.g., H. DE LUBAC, THE DRAMA OF ATHEIST HUMANISM 156 (1963) (referring to the
"religion of Humanity"); J. HUXLEY, supra note 31, at 1 (humanism is a religion regardless
of the absence of revelation or belief in a supernatural being); M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY AND CONSCIENCE 51-59 (1968) ("[tlhe substantive proposition is that the Establishment
Clause requires the conclusion that the word 'religion' in the First Amendment encompasses
religions that do not worship a Supreme Being or a supernatural power, as well as those that
do"); Stahmer, Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom, in 1 RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC ORDER 124-29 (D. Giannella ed. 1939) (the term religion is not necessarily con-
cerned with a Supreme Being, but does include ultimate concerns with or without an act of
personal commitment); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism
in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 177, 199-204 ("[alny deliberate attempt to use
the law to ban theism, while advancing nontheism is a law 'respecting an establishment of a
religion' . . . for it promotes one belief-system over another"); 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA
592 (1974) (term "secular religion" included in the definition of religion); see also 13 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA AMERICANA 342 (1969) ("religion of humanity" included in the definition of reli-
gion); 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 410 (1961); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE 1212 (1967).
" See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961); Fellowship of Humanity v. County
of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1957). In Torcaso, the Supreme
Court listed secular humanism as a religion. 367 U.S. at 495 n.. In Fellowship of Human-
ity, the California District Court of Appeals looked to the nature of humanism in concluding
that it is a religion within the meaning of the state constitution. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 692-93,
315 P.2d at 406. The court noted that the humanists met every Sunday for "meetings"
which included periods of meditation, song, readings, a speaker, a collection and announce-
ments. Id. at 678-79, 315 P.2d at 397. The court concluded that humanism is a religion since
the group's activities were similar to theistic groups in all respects except that humanists
did not believe in a Supreme Being. Id. at 698, 315 P.2d at 409-10; see Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946); infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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amendment. 39 To constitute a religion, according to this definition, one's
belief need not include faith in a Supreme Being or even in the
supernatural. °
Observers have noted that for many Americans, public education has
become the equivalent of a national religion, and public schools have be-
come a substitute for churches.41 Ward G. Reeder observes:
America's faith in education has been called by a European visitor the "na-
tional religion of America." This faith appeared almost simultaneously with
the first settlements,. . . and it has grown more and more firm as the years
have rolled by .... It has been buttressed by two beliefs: (1) that the wel-
fare, the progress, and the perpetuity of society are determined largely by
39 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); Toscano, supra note 37, at 182. In
Thomas, an employee in a roll foundry was transferred to a department that produced tur-
rets for military tanks. 450 U.S. at 710. He quit because the production of armaments was
contrary to his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. Id. In determining the definition of "religious
beliefs," the Court noted that it should not be a question of the Court's perception of the
religion. Id. at 714. The Court noted further that "[rieligious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion." Id. In Seeger, the Court construed the term "religious training and belief," which was
part of a statute exempting conscientious objectors from service in the armed forces. 380
U.S. at 173. The Court stated that this definition would be satisfied by "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the god of those admittedly qualifying." Id. at 176.
40 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 495 n.ll (1961); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946). Since its decision in
Everson, the Supreme Court has been presented with several opportunities to define reli-
gion. While it may be inferred from many of the Court's decisions that secular humanism
has been accepted as a religion in a legal sense, the Court also has specifically designated
secular humanism as among "religions" which do not teach the existence of God. Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. In Abington, Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer were banned in public schools. 374 U.S. at 223-26. The Court spoke of "a religion of
secularism," noting that "the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense
of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe
in no religion over those who do believe.'" Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952)); see also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d
430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981) (religion exists when "ultimate concern" of devotees is "adherence to
sect's theological doctrines" and "comprehensive set of religious beliefs"); Malnak v. Yogi,
440 F. Supp. 1284, 1313-14 (D.N.J. 1977) (belief in a "god" is not a prerequisite to finding
that a belief is religious), affd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
41 See Dewey, Education as a Religion, in THE NE w RmULIC, Sept. 13, 1922, at 63-65. One
commentator, comparing present-day public education to the established church of the
Middle Ages in Europe, argued that "the public school is the established church of today
and a substitute institution for the medieval church and dedicated to the same monolithic
conception of society." R. RUSHDOONY, THE MESSIANIC CHARACTER Or AMERICAN EDUCATION
314 (1972); see AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION STUDIES, COMMITTEE ON RELIGION & EDU-
CATION, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 45 (1947); J. BRUBACHER, MODERN
PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION 321 (1939).
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1983
the education of the people, and (2) that the individual can best realize his
potentialities in happiness and accomplishment through education. 2
Moreover, it has been recognized that the principles cultivated in our
public schools are the same as those of Unitarianism."' Originally, the
Unitarians insisted on the oneness of God, rejecting the doctrine of the
Trinity and with it the Divinity of Christ. Many American Unitarians
soon became more rationalistic and agnostic, denying the existence of a
personal God in favor of the concept of a general power or principle.
Their views thus became very close to those of secular humanism."
Religion, in the broad sense of ultimate concern and purpose, is an
essential ingredient of any culture or civilization, and, therefore, should
be a fundamental element of that culture's educational program. In trans-
mitting a' culture or civilization, schools are transmitting either a theistic
culture-a religious culture, one "with God"-or a secularistic cul-
ture-an irreligious or atheistic culture, one "without God." In this sense,
our public schools, as well as our private schools, are inculcating
religion.4"
42 W. REEDER, A FIRST COURSE IN EDUCATION 9 (1950). Professor Reeder noted early evi-
dence of public education's synonymity with national religion. Id. The early settlers imme-
diately established schools. Id. at 10. There also was a plethora of early legislation com-
manding compulsory school attendance, mandating the establishment of a sufficient number
of schools, and requiring the improvement of certain school standards. Id. at 11-19.
43 According to Rousas J. Rushdoony:
The Messianic Utopianism of early [public school] educators often took extravagant
form. . . . [Iln the early years the educators were far surpassed in their extravagance
by the Unitarian clergy. Although other churches contributed to the movements, Uni-
tarianism particularly aided the cause of messianic education.
R. RUSHDOONY, supra note 41, at 333.
4 See generally G. COOKE, UItrARIANISM IN AMERICA 198-99 (1902); D. HOWE, THE UNITA-
RIAN CONSCIENCE 305 (1970); E. WILBUR, A HISTORY OF UNITARIANISM 462 (1945); C. WRIGHT,
THE BEGINNINGS OF UNITARIANISM IN AMERICA 253 (1955).
46 See Editorial, Parochial and Private, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 20, 1961, at 3, 4. An edi-
torial, advocating the denial of federal aid to education, states:
[Wie misunderstand the scheme if we think of the state as neutral. It is neutral in
that it must prefer none of our many religious and cultural strains. But it itself is
committed to exerting a secular, unifying, equalitarian force. While required impar-
tially to accept the presence in society of sectarian influences, that state is neverthe-
less itself a party in the contest. To accept the principle of general support of public
and private schools equally out of public funds is to abandon the mission of the state,
since it removes the single most effective inducement available to the state to draw
people to its system of schools and away from centrifugal systems. To this extent, it is
the mission of the state to discourage parochial schools, just as it is the mission of the
Catholic Church, for example, to discourage Catholic attendance in public schools.
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The Unconstitutional Establishment of a Religion or Irreligion of
Secularism
Special governmental subsidization of any form of religion or irreli-
gion in education has been banned repeatedly under the Supreme Court's
restrictive interpretation of the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment.4 It is suggested, therefore, that if secularism or secular humanism
is a form of religion or even if it is simply irreligion or opposition to tradi-
tional religion, and if the secularism is inculcated exclusively in our pub-
licly subsidized schools, then such subsidization amounts to an unconsti-
tutional establishment of religion. Such an exclusive subsidy constitutes
the preferential and monopolistic sponsorship and promotion of the con-
cepts, considerations, and values of one religion-secularism or secular
humanism-to the neglect, disfavor and disadvantage of other religions.
The constitutional prohibition against laws aiding the establishment
of a religion applies, according to the Supreme Court, to secularist reli-
gions or life-outlooks which do not accept the existence of God, as well as
to religions that do. Additionally, it applies to "irreligion" or denial of
religion ("religion's militant opposite") as well as to "religion" or affirma-
tion of religion. The key Supreme Court decisions and opinions establish-
" See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (statute requiring that the Ten
Commandments be posted in public school classrooms is violative of the establishment
clause); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (funding for textbook loan program and
diagnostic and therapeutic services upheld, but funding for instructional materials, equip-
ment and field trip transportation declared unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 364-65, 372-73 (1975) (constitutionality of Pennsylvania's textbook loan program up-
held, but instructional materials and equipment loan program held unconstitutional); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973) (statute au-
thorizing reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with administration and cor-
recting of examinations declared unconstitutional as impermissible aid to religion); Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80, 794 (1973) (funds
for maintenance and repair of nonpublic schools, tuition grants and tax credits to parents
with children in nonpublic schools declared unconstitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 625 (1971) (state statute providing aid to nonpublic schools, including salary supple-
ments for teachers, and money for textbooks and instructional materials held unconstitu-
tional); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (state law providing
for Bible readings and school board ruling providing for recitation of prayer held unconsti-
tutional as violative of the first amendment); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (class-
room prayer prescribed by state statute held unconstitutional as violative of first amend-
ment even though pupils were able to remain silent or be excused from the room); Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948) (use of public school system to
enable sectarian groups to give religious instruction to public school students violates first
amendment); Treen v. Karen B., 653 F.2d 897, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (statute authorizing
voluntary student or teacher initiated prayer during school hours held unconstitutional),
aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1267 (1982); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 520 (3d
Cir.) (statute authorizing exemption for taxpayers whose dependent children attend private
schools violates first amendment), aff'd, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
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ing this principle may be summarized briefly.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of
Education:47
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.48
This prohibition was reiterated in Torcaso v. Watkins.49 In Torcaso, the
Court declared: "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can consti-
tutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a be-
lief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs." 50 Subsequently, the same restriction was restated summarily in
School District of Abington v. Schempp.61 The Schempp Court stated
that "[ifn the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality.""s Finally, an elaboration on gov-
ernmental neutrality with respect to religion, including irreligion, is con-
41 330 U.S. 1 (1946). At issue in Everson, was a New Jersey statute authorizing district
boards of education to promulgate regulations for transporting children and to reimburse
transportation costs to parents of children attending public and private schools. Id. at 3.
The statute was challenged by a taxpayer who claimed that such reimbursement to parents
of Catholic schoolchildren violated the State and Federal Constitutions in two respects: the
payments violated the due process clause, and they violated the first amendment. Id. at 3-5.
The Court held that the payments did not violate due process since the funds were spent for
a public purpose. Id. at 7. The statute did not violate the first amendment because the
amendment does not prohibit the expenditure of tax-raised funds for transportation of pri-
vate schoolchildren. Id. at 17.
48 Id. at 15-16.
49 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 'In Torcaso, an individual was appointed a notary public. Id. at 489.
As a prerequisite to taking office, the individual, Torcaso, was required by the Maryland
Constitution to take an oath declaring his belief in God. Id. He refused to do so and was
denied a commission. Id. Torcaso brought suit contending that the requirement violated the
first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
Id. at 495.
61 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In Schempp, two cases were consolidated for review. In the first case,
parents of public schoolchildren challenged a Pennsylvania statute which provided:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the open-
ing of each public school on each schoolday. Any child shall be excused from such
Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent
or guardian.
Id. at 205. In the second case, a Maryland school board regulation providing for Bible read-
ing and recitation of the Lord's Prayer was challenged as unconstitutional under the first
amendment. Id. at 205, 211-12.
6 Id. at 226.
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tained in Epperson v. Arkansas:53
[The Government] may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of
non-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious
theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and reli-
gion, and between religion and nonreligion."'
Notably, in Schempp, the Supreme Court explicitly included the "reli-
gion of secularism" or the belief of "those who believe in no religion" in
the prohibition embraced by the establishment clause, stating that "[w]e
agree of course that the state may not establish a 'religion of secularism'
in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus
'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.' "5
FURTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
In addition to violating the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, exclusive governmental support of public education that inculcates
secularism violates other provisions of the Constitution, and runs counter
to its fundamental purpose and spirit. It infringes upon the free exercise
clause of the first amendment," it violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment,"7 it deprives parents of their constitutional
"right to control the education of their children,"" and it negates the
fundamental purpose and spirit of the Constitution-the securing of the
utmost "liberty" for American citizens.5 9
Denial of Free Exercise of Religion
Exclusive governmental financing of schools which inculcate secular-
ism or secular humanism transgresses the free exercise right of those par-
ents and children who are compelled by lack of alternative tax-supported
schools to utilize secularist public schools. 60 Students in purely secular
" 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, a public school biology teacher challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of theories of evolution in public
schools and universities. Id. at 98-100. The school administration adopted a book containing
a chapter which set forth the theory that men evolved from other species of life. Id. at 99.
The teacher sought a declaration that the statute was void, and injunctive relief to prevent
the school system from dismissing her for violating the statute. Id. at 100.
" Id. at 104. The Court held that the statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments
because it interfered with the free exercise of religion. Id. at 109.
" 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
" See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
o See Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HAlv. EDUc.
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schools cannot avoid being imbued with the religion or irreligion of secu-
larism or secular humanism. Thus, they may become accustomed to an-
swering questions and solving problems independently of traditional reli-
gious considerations, which often transcend and differ from those of
unaided human reason.61 As has been noted, examples of sensitive and
important moral questions discussed in public school classes are those
concerning ultimate personal ambitions and goals, pursuit of supreme
happiness, marriage, family living, divorce, overpopulation and means of
population control, physical and mental health, sexual attitudes and rela-
tions, birth control, abortion, taking of human life (as in capital punish-
ment and euthanasia), and death. The result is that many parents and
students are compelled by compulsory school attendance laws, together
with economic limitations, to use schools which inculcate outlooks, con-
cepts, views, and habits which may be contrary to their religious faith.
In addition to the violation of free exercise rights of parents who
send their children to public schools, first amendment guarantees are also
REv. 76, 100-01 (1976). According to Arons, the present state school-financing system,
whereby the state provides a "free" public education to all qualifying children, acts to in-
hibit the exercise of first amendment freedoms. Id. at 100. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that government benefits may not be conditioned upon the sacrifice of first
amendment rights. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963). The Sherbert Court
held that "conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate ... as to
inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. According to Arons the
current school-financing system conditions the provisions of "free" education upon the sac-
rifice by parents of their first amendment rights. Arons, supra, at 100. Arons states that
"this is precisely the effect of a school system that requires a child to attend a school con-
trolled by a majority of the public in order to receive a 'free' education. The public school
will represent and attempt to inculcate values that a particular family may find abhorrent to
its own basic beliefs and way of life." Id. Faced with such a system, the family must either
reject its own beliefs to receive a state-subsidized education for their child, or forfeit the
available public education to preserve their family values and beliefs. Id.
61 See Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). In Whisner, a group of
Amish parents were convicted of violating a state statute which required the parent or
guardian of a child of compulsory school age to send that child to school. Id. at 183, 351
N.E.2d at 752. The defendants had kept their children out of a religious elementary school
because of their objections to certain "minimum standards" promulgated by the State of
Ohio relating to the operation of all schools within the state. Id. at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 756-
57. It was contended that these "minimum standards" infringed upon, inter alia, the right
of defendants and their children to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 198, 351 N.E.2d at 757. In reversing the
defendants' convictions, the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically admitted that the conflict-
ing philosophy, curriculum, and teaching required by the State Department of Education of
Ohio would violate the free exercise right of the Amish' if they were required in religious
private schools. Id. at 209-10, 351 N.E.2d at 764; see City of Summer v. First Baptist
Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982) (en banc) (court must balance govern-
ment's interest in enforcing statute with appellant's right to free exercise of religion).
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denied parents who send their children to private schools." Due to com-
pulsory education laws on the one hand and general taxes on the other,
parents who send their children to church-related schools because of reli-
gious convictions are forced to bear double educational expenses. First,
they must pay for the education provided in public schools, which they
cannot utilize because of their religious convictions, and second, for the
unsubsidized education of their children in schools which includes reli-
gion along with secular subjects. They thus are compelled to pay extra for
the free exercise of their religion, which includes its effective transmission
to the next generation.
The United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner" declared
that it is unconstitutional for government to impose a direct or indirect
penalty or burden upon a person for the exercise of a constitutional right,
such as that of free exercise of religion, unless such a course is necessary
in order to protect a substantial and compelling government interest." It
is submitted that no such compelling governmental interest exists to jus-
tify the financial burdens imposed on parents who send their children to
church-related schools.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The exclusive financing of secularist education by government also
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 The
2 See Arons, supra note 60, at 103-04; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925). In Pierce, the Supreme Court held that the state may not compel all children
to attend public schools, 268 U.S. at 534-35, concluding that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State," id. at 535. The Pierce Court further stated, however, that the state
has the power "reasonably" to regulate all schools. Id. at 534. It has been argued that this
power to regulate may result in a substantial burden on first amendment rights. Arons,
supra note 60, at 103. Such a possibility could be eliminated by requiring a state that seeks
to regulate private schooling to show "either that the regulation affects only the incidents of
schooling ...or that there is an overriding justification for the regulation." Id.
3 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Id. at 406. The appellant in Sherbert, a member of the Sabbatarian Church, was denied
welfare benefits because she refused to accept employment which involved work on Satur-
day. Id. at 399. The Supreme Court held that to require her to work on Saturday would
violate her freedom of religion, since Saturday is a holy day of rest and religious worship
according to Sabbatarians. Id. at 410. The principle enunciated by the Court was that it is
unconstitutional for government to impose a burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right unless it is necessary to protect a compelling state interest. Id. at 406; see Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716-18 (1981); supra note
39 and accompanying text.
" See Arons, supra note 60, at 101-03. According to Arons, the present school-financing
system discriminates against the poor in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 101. Under the current system, the affluent may opt to send their
children to the private school of their choice, while the economically disadvantaged are "ef-
fectively denied their right of choice because they can neither afford to exercise choice nor
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present system creates a classification between parents and students who
utilize completely secularist public schools, and those who utilize inde-
pendent schools which include traditional religious instruction within
their otherwise secular curriculum. Federal, state, and local governments
provide public educational benefits to the former but deny them to the
latter, and thereby "deny. . . the equal protection of the laws" 6 to par-
ents who choose to send their children to government-approved, church-
related schools.
The classification of parents and children into those utilizing secular-
ist public schools and those using church-related schools, and the with-
holding of benefits from the latter while according them to the former is
unnecessary and unreasonable. Its sole defense is the dubious proposition
that to provide similar benefits for those who use church-related schools
would be tantamount to promoting religion and would thus offend the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Nevertheless, it has been
seen that public schools promote the religion or irreligion of secularism,
and that the present educational policy amounts to an exclusive promo-
tion of one system of religious or irreligious beliefs. That the government
and the Supreme Court distinguish between public and church-related
schools with insufficient justification is supported by the notion that most
western democracies provide public subsidizaton for students in secularist
as well as church-related schools, without the fear or the actual effect of
establishing a particular form of religion or irreligion, and with no loss of
democratic liberties.
6 7
refuse to attend school." Id. Thus, Arons contends, governmental financing of public schools
and denial of aid to sectarian schools prevents the poor from having a free choice, guaran-
teed by the first amendment, as to where their children should be educated. Id. at 101-02.
The result of this system of education is to deny citizens fundamental rights due to their
economic status, an outcome repeatedly held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Id. at
102; see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (failure to pay
registration fee may not result in loss of voting privilege); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 355 (1963) (denial of counsel on appeal to an indigent held unconstitutional); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (state may not discriminate on basis of poverty in criminal
trials by denying indigents free transcripts).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
07 There is a trend among Western Governments to support private as well as public
schools. In England, free education is available at voluntary schools maintained by the local
educational authority. Parents are allowed a portion of tuition fees if they desire to send
their children to private institutions outside their school districts. Watt v. Kesteven County
Council, [1955] 1 All E.R. 473, 478-79. Section 81 of England's Education Act of 1944 pro-
vides for funds to reimburse parents for fees, thereby enabling students to utilize any insti-
tutions available to them. Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 39, § 81, reprinted in 11
HALsBuRY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 237-38 (A. Younge 3d ed. 1969).
Norwegian common schools have given religious as well as secular training since their
inception. L. ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SCANDINAVIAN LAW 193 (1953). Their folk schools,
which were incorporated by theologians, have become a regular facet in the national educa-
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The Abrogation of a Natural and Constitutional Parental Right
The present policy of exclusive governmental financing of secularist
public education in the United States also effectively deprives many par-
ents of their natural constitutional right to direct and control the educa-
tion of their children, and severely penalizes other parents for their exer-
cise of this constitutional right. Banned from obtaining general
educational subsidization for the education of their children if they send
them to church-related schools, many parents who are unable to meet the
price of private education after paying taxes, are financially compelled to
send their children to secularist public schools. Meanwhile, those parents
who are able to pay the price of private church-related education after
paying their taxes are penalized by the government for the exercise of
their constitutional right to control and direct the education of their chil-
dren.6e In short, the first class of parents are prevented from exercising a
tional system. Id. In Denmark, the subsidy paid by the state for each pupil is the same
whether he attends a private or public school. W. FRASER, REFORMS AND RzsTAiN'S IN
MODERN FRENCH EDUCATION 3-5 (1971); see T. HEUBENER, THE SCHOOLS OF WEST GERMANY
62-63, 128-32 (1962).
" See Arons, supra note 60, at 99-104; cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01, 403
(1923) (statute prohibiting modern foreign language instruction for students who had not
yet reached the eighth grade was unconstitutional on the ground that it infringed upon
liberties guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment). The Meyer Court concluded that it was
not only the parent's natural right and duty to control the education of their children but
was, in fact, a right ensured by the Constitution. Id. at 400-01.
Similarly, an Oregon law requiring that all pupils between the ages of 8 and 16 years
attend only public schools was deemed unconstitutional in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, stated that it was not
the state, but the parents who should be the final arbiters in deciding where their children
will be educated. Id. The Court continued its support of this position in Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), when it refused to uphold state regulations limiting the
number and age of students attending Japanese language schools. Id. at 298-99. In Farring-
ton, the Court noted its wariness of state restrictions which "would deprive parents of fair
opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think important ... " Id.
at 298.
Sixteen years after Farrington, in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the
Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance by a state board of education which made
saluting the American flag mandatory in their schools. Id. at 642. This was objected to by
Jehovah's Witnesses who were unable to comply because of their religious beliefs. Id. at 629.
While praising an attempt to foster patriotism, the Court ruled that the cornerstone of
American government was the free consent of the people, and that any enforced participa-
tion in ceremonial functions was contrary to both the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.
Id. at 638-40.
Subsequently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a compulsory high school
attendance law was held unconstitutional when it conflicted with Amish religious beliefs. Id.
at 234. The Court again affirmed its position that a state has an obligation reasonably to
regulate the education of children, but concluded that the state's interest "is not totally free
from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests; such as
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constitutional right, while the second class are punished for exercising
this right.
The United States Supreme Court firmly has established the princi-
ple that the Constitution guarantees to parents the right to control and
direct the education of their children. The Supreme Court recognizes and
confirms this right as among the essential human liberties and democratic
freedoms the Constitution was meant to protect and promote. In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters," the Supreme Court stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.70
This principle of the right of parents to control the education of their
children has been endorsed by the nations of the world and enshrined
among basic human rights in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" of the United Nations. Section 3 of Article 26 of this declaration,
to which the United States is a signatory, states: "Parents have a prior
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their
children. 71
The magnitude of the penalty imposed by government refusal to pro-
vide otherwise universal educational tax benefits to those parents and
children who utilize church-related schools, instead of secularist public
schools, becomes apparent upon recognition that the average cost of ele-
mentary and secondary education in the United States in 1981 was $2,002
per child.7 2 If a parent had four children in school this would amount to
over $8,000 per year. For 12 years of elementary and secondary education
the penalty would amount to over $24,000 for a parent with one child and
over $96,000 for a parent with four children. The imposition of this heavy
burden upon parental choice of an education that includes religion along
with secular subjects is unconstitutional because it is not necessary in or-
der to protect a compelling and substantial government interest.
73
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children
.. " Id. at 214.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70 Id. at 535.
7' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XXVI, § 3, G.A. Dec., U.N. Doc. A/217, at 7
(1948).
71 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDU-
CATION STATISTICS, 1981-1982 (1981).
'$ See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (to justify any burden on an individual's
free exercise of religion, a state must show a compelling interest); NAACP v. Button, 371
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Abrogation of the Concept of Liberty
At the foundation of the Constitution lies the principle that citizens
are guaranteed the greatest measure of liberty consistent with the general
public welfare. "Liberty" has always been America's national watchword.
The Declaration of Independence, which formally announced the Found-
ing Fathers' intentions of automony, begins:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these rights Governments are instituted among Men .... "I
"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" are the nation's three cher-
ished values and primary objectives. No qualifying restriction, other than
that which may be demanded by reason, is placed upon liberty. It is a
term reasonably construed to include freedom of choice in education and
freedom to include religion in the curriculum without being deprived of a
fair share of tax benefits. For many, life's fundamental pursuits include
the quest for spiritual salvation and eternal beatitude.
Provision for the greatest possible individual freedom was a primary
purpose of the Constitution as well as the Declaration of Independence.
The preamble to the Constitution states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
... and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.7 5
In accordance with this libertarian intention, the Constitution grants the
federal government only those powers specifically enumerated, and
reserves to the states all other powers.71
Since the maximum individual liberty consistent with the general
welfare is a prime purpose and basic value of the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has gone to extreme lengths on many occasions to defend
and uphold the rights and freedoms of individuals, even though such in-
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment free-
doms"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (state must show compelling interest
to justify a procedure which results in suppressing protected speech).
7' The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
7 U.S. CONST. preamble.
76 See id. amend. X. The Constitution states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id. The separation of powers between the federal govern-
ment and the states was accomplished by identifying the central government's authority in
specific matters and relegating whatever remained to the states. See generally L. Tae,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 300-06 (1978).
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dividuals may have been guilty of crimes or flagrant violations of the
moral standards of the community."7 In its decisions annulling any share
of educational tax benefits for parents and children using church-related
schools, however, the Court has taken a diametrically opposite stance. 8
Certainly the freedom to utilize any form of state-approved schools to
fulfill compulsory education laws, and to include religion along with secu-
lar subjects in education of the young without incurring penalties that
amount to several thousands of dollars, should not summarily be ex-
cluded from the basic human liberties protected by the United States
Constitution.
Whether secularism or secular humanism is a religion or irreligion, its
exclisive fostering and sponsorship by government, through preferential
financing of secularist education, is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
has declared that government cannot constitutionally foster or promote
irreligion as opposed to religion, any more than it can foster religion as
opposed to irreligion, or any specific form or forms of religion as opposed
to others."'
The Present Financing Scheme and Democracy
The present system of financing education in the United States, in
addition to being unconstitutional, is contrary to fundamental principles
of democracy. Indeed, this system corresponds more to the educational
policies of totalitarian Communist countries than to our own democratic
ideals. By depriving many Americans of freedom of choice in education,
the present policy not only restricts freedom of education but also cur-
tails freedom of thought, freedom of communication, and freedom of reli-
gion, as well as fundamental individual, familial, and parental rights and
liberties. In Communist countries, such as the Soviet Union, the govern-
See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1967) (heroin found on defendant's
person inadmissible because fruit of unlawful search and seizure); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (forcible extraction of the contents of an accused's stomach to re-
cover morphine capsules violated defendant's right to due process); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 455-56 (1948) (evidence of a "numbers" operation inadmissible if
seized in violation of the fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures).
T See, e.g., Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir.), affd, 442
U.S. 756 (1979); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
"Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (government must maintain neutrality
between different religions, or between religion and nonreligion); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (state is securely committed to a neutral stance toward
differing religions); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (no laws may be passed
that would aid one religion at the expense of another); Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1947) (neither federal nor state government can establish a church, or favor one reli-
gion over another).
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ment supports only governmental public education, which is exclusively
secular. The United States similarly supports only public education of a
secular nature. Perhaps the sole distinction is that in Communist coun-
tries, private education is prohibited; only public education is permitted
by law.
These Communist countries use government monopoly of education
as a means of thought control and enforced indoctrination, openly im-
posed by constitutional and legal provisions. While in this country no
such policy could be proclaimed publicly, it is nevertheless being effectu-
ated with the aid of Supreme Court decisions which limit the use of edu-
cational funds exclusively to secular educational institutions. If this con-
dition continues, it will be only a short time until American elementary
and secondary education is almost entirely secular. As more affluent pub-
lic schools tend to improve, parents of children in privately controlled
schools will be tempted for financial reasons to send their children to free,
"well-fixed" public schools. As enrollments in independent schools de-
cline, the survival of parent-controlled private schools becomes doubtful,
and thus parents' ability to direct the education of their children becomes
more tenuous.
SUPREME COURT STANDARDS
Factors considered in recent Supreme Court cases concerning incul-
cation of religion in church-related schools may also be applied to incul-
cation of secularism in public schools. These factors, which include gen-
eral nature and atmosphere, pervasiveness, teachers, potential, neutrality
or bias, and surveillance, can be applied to demonstrate that public
schools are not religion-neutral 0 and thus their exclusive governmental
subsidization is unconstitutional."1 It can also be shown that certainty
See Toscano, supra note 37, at 199-204. According to Toscano, "Education does more
than explain what, how, and when. It attempts to explain why. And whenever educators
begin to give their students the reasons behind a fact or an event, they immediately enter
the realm of ideology." Id. at 200. Toscano suggests that a "deliberate attempt to use the
law to ban theism, while advancing nontheism is a law 'respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.'" Id. at 201 n.91; see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, 81 H&Av. L. REv. 513, 561 (1968) (education "directly touches" upon human
values).
81 See Giannella, supra note 80, at 561. Giannella notes that education implicates religious
matters including the "sources and nature" of moral values. Id.; Toscano, supra note 37, at
200 (moral overtones "pervade" true education). No public education is entirely neutral,
and therefore, an exclusive governmental subsidization of public education is arguably un-
constitutional. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish secular educational func-
tions from religious functions. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
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concerning the enforcement of religious neutrality is just as impossible to
achieve and as impractical to enforce in the case of public education as it
is in that of church-related education.82 Consequently, to be truly neutral,
government must either cease its financing of education entirely or subsi-
dize religion-inclusive education as well as secularist public education.
Only then can government maintain strict neutrality between various
forms of religion, as well as between religion and irreligion.
General Nature and Atmosphere
The Supreme Court has characterized church-related schools as "in-
stitutions," having a "religious atmosphere,' 8 3 possessing a "substantial
religious character,"' 4 and constituting "a powerful vehicle for transmit-
tionality of salary supplements paid to teachers in nonpublic schools who teach secular sub-
jects. Id. at 607. The Court noted that aid to church-related schools previously was permit-
ted when the activities were "neutral" or "secular." Id. at 616. However, in the case of
actual teaching the Court could not "ignore the danger that a teacher under religious con-
trol. . . poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of precollege
education." Id. at 617. As a result, extensive surveillance would be required to assure that
the separation was properly maintained. Id. at 619.
U See Toscano, supra note 37, at 199-204. The Court has established certain criteria for
determining the constitutionality of statutes providing aid to nonpublic schools. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). First, its legislative purpose must be secular. Id.
at 612. Second, the primary effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion.
Id. Third, "the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.'" Id. at 613. (quoting Waiz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). In declaring
invalid Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes which would subsidize teachers of secular
subjects in nonpublic schools, the Lemon Court concluded that the amount of supervision
necessary to insure compliance with first amendment restrictions would not only be prohibi-
tory, but would, in fact, involve the state in religious matters to an unwarranted degree. 403
U.S. at 619.
"' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1971). In Lemon, the two specific "institu-
tions" with a "religious atmosphere" referred to were the Rhode Island Roman Catholic
elementary schools and the Pennsylvania church-related elementary and secondary schools.
Id. at 615, 620. Both school systems were "controlled by religious organizations, hav[ing] the
purpose of propagating and promoting a particular religious faith, and conduct[ing] their
operations to fulfill that purpose." Id. at 620. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973), the "religious institutions" at issue were 280 schools in New York State, the
majority of which were "related to the Roman Catholic Church and [taught] Catholic reli-
gious doctrine to some degree." Id. at 768. Interestingly, over 12% of students nationwide
attend church-related schools, with the largest concentration in Roman Catholic institu-
tions. Gianella, supra note 80, at 572 & n.175.
" Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973); see Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 743 (1973). In Hunt, the Court addressed the character of the institution with
respect to uses of financial assistance, noting that aid has the effect of advancing religion
"when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of
its functions are subsumed in the religious mission ...." Id.
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ting. . . faith to the next generation." ' Their "profile," according to the
Court, includes several features which reflect a religious character, such as
a requirement of attendance at religious instruction, a purpose of trans-
mitting religious values, and an imposition of religious regulations as to
what and how the faculty may teach.se Public schools, on the other hand,
due to restrictive Court decisions and other factors, are completely secu-
larist religious or irreligious educational institutions, in character and at-
mosphere. Their profile is as secularist as church-related schools are tra-
ditionally religious. The public schools also require attendance,
exclusively inculcate secularist values, and impose restrictions that ex-
clude any counterbalancing inculcation of religious doctrines and religious
values.
Pervasiveness
The Supreme Court charges that church-related schools have "the
pervasive atmosphere of a religious institution, '87 in which the secular
and religious are inextricably intertwined." Similarly, public schools are
thoroughly secular institutions with a pervasive secularist atmosphere. In
public schools, traditional religious views are completely excluded.89
8 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) (citing Di Censo v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp.
112, 117 (D.R.I. 1970), affd sub nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
" Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973) (quoting Nyquist, 350
F. Supp. at 663). The Court in Nyquist noted that in New York State "[slome 700,000 to
800,000 students, constituting 20% of the State's entire elementary and secondary school
population, attend over 2,000 nonpublic schools, approximately 85% of which are church
affiliated." 413 U.S. at 768; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (when consid-
ering whether governmental entanglement is violative of the first amendment, inquiry is
made into character and purposes of the institution benefited, as well as the type of govern-
mental aid provided and the relationship between the state and the institution).
87 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977).
" Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975). Because the secular education provided by
church-related schools "'goes hand in hand"' with the religious purposes, "'the two are
inextricably intertwined.'" Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971)). As a
result, aid consisting of even "neutral" educational materials violates the establishment
clause of the Constitution. 421 U.S. at 366.
89 See Toscano, supra note 37, at 184-85. A secularist is defined as "[a] person who rejects
all religious systems and forms of worship, concerning himself only with the questions and
needs of present life ... one who believes that religion should not be introduced into public
education or the management of public affairs." FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2214 (1952). The practical effect of the Court's exclusion of
religious views has prohibited schoolchildren from reciting prayers, and prevented religious
instruction to students and parents of students who desire it, both during and after school
hours. Toscano, supra note 37, at 185. This viewpoint has also had the effect of preventing
use of government funds for the purchase of religious textbooks or the construction of a
building in which religious services will be conducted. Id. at 186. For a discussion of state
neutrality in keeping public schools secular, see Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neu-
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Teachers
The Supreme Court has stated that teachers in church-related
schools cannot be monitored as to their inculcation of religion even in the
course of teaching secular subjects. The Court has proclaimed that "a
textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject
is not."0 The Court has also observed that teachers in church-related
schools cannot help communicating and inculcating their religious out-
looks and ideas even if they intend otherwise. 1 The danger of surrepti-
tious or inadvertent inculcation of religion by teachers of secular subjects
in church-related schools, according to the Court, is both great and con-
stant.9 So pervasive is this influence that it is even present and active in
the composition of ordinary examinations."3 In fact, the danger of teach-
trality, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 426, 437-40 (1973).
90 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971). In Lemon, the Court distinguished Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968), in which the State of New York required local
public school authorities to distribute textbooks to both private and public school students
in grades 7 through 12. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Allen Court found that it could not
be concluded that "all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of
secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students
by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion." 392 U.S. at 248; see
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. In Lemon, however, the Court concluded that "[u]nlike a book, a
teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent of his or her personal beliefs
..... " 403 U.S. at 619. In the case of a teacher pressed by religious authorities "the poten-
tial for impermissible fostering of religion is present." Id.
91 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19. Referring to teachers in church-related schools, the Lemon
Court noted that "[w]ith the best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a
total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine." Id. Therefore, to prevent
"entanglement" between state and church, continued state surveillance was mandated. Id.
at 619. One commentator has argued to the contrary, however, that state aid to secular
educational programs in church-related institutions-the point at issue in Lemon-can be
justified, particularly in church-related colleges. Giannella, supra note 80, at 583. A church-
related college does not inculcate certain values to form a "religious character," as elemen-
tary schools do. See id. A college student has had his religious beliefs formulated by the
time he or she enters college and an attempt to change them would be "self-defeating." Id.
As a result, continued surveillance to prevent entanglement between church and state loses
force in higher educational institutions.
92 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
' See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1973). In Levitt, $28 mil-
lion was appropriated for reimbursing nonpublic schools in New York for the costs of "ad-
ministration, grading and the compiling and reporting of the results" of various standard-
ized and internally prepared tests. Id. at 474 (footnotes omitted). New York taxpayers filed
suit, alleging that the statute abridged the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id.
at 478. The Court noted that the tests played an "integral" role in the teaching process, but
no means existed to assure that teacher-prepared tests were "free of religious instruction."
Id. at 480. As a result, the Court concluded that the "substantial risk" that the tests pre-
pared by teachers under the auspices of religious authority might inculcate students in reli-
gious precepts could not be ignored, and thus the enabling statute was held to be unconsti-
tutional. Id.
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ers inculcating faith and morals is even present when they are conducting
secular field trips," or providing secular auxiliary services such as reme-
dial reading."
If this constant and unavoidable tendency to impart personal ideolo-
gies is present in the case of teachers in church-related schools, and more-
over exists in the case of a secular teacher who comes into a church-re-
lated school to teach a secular subject," how can it not be present in the
case of secularist teachers in secularist public schools? Just as the reli-
gious atmosphere of a church-related school is supposed to affect the oth-
erwise secular teacher of the secular subject in such a school, so-the secu-
larist atmosphere of the secular public schools must affect teachers,
whether they are secularists themselves or otherwise religious persons.
Further, it is no easier to monitor the naturalistic and secularistic indoc-
trination and influence of the secular teacher in a secular public school
than it is to monitor teachers in private schools.
Potential
The United States Supreme Court has insisted that the mere "poten-
tial for impermissible fostering of religion" in the teaching of secular sub-
jects in church-related schools is sufficient to invalidate legislation pro-
viding these schools with governmental assistance. "7 The Court has gone
so far as to project the potential danger of an establishment of religion as
a possible result of such aid, stating that "involvement or entanglement"
between government and religion ultimately could result in a "progres-
sion leading to the establishment of state churches and state religion." 8
" See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1977). The Court in Wolman noted several
particularities that differentiated a traditional bus fare program which survived "constitu-
tional muster" from a field trip which did not. See id. at 253. In the case of field trips,
schools, as opposed to students, are benefited by the aid. Id. The Court noted that this
point alone might make any funding impermissible direct aid to sectarian institutions. Id.
Additionally, it is the subjective attitude of the teacher that makes any field trip worthwhile
and stimulating. Id. As a result, when a teacher working within a sectarian institution con-
ducts such an activity, "an unacceptable risk of fostering of religion is an inevitable by-
product," and therefore, it contravenes the first amendment establishment clause. Id. at
254.
" See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975). The danger present in remedial read-
ing is the same danger echoed by the Court whenever teachers and counselors are in-
volved-a subsidized teacher may "fail on occasion to separate religious instruction and the
advancement of religious beliefs from his secular educational responsibilities." Id. at 371.
The Court recognized that although the danger may be less in the case of remedial reading,
the entanglement was still a violation of the constitutional prohibition "respecting establish-
ing of religion." Id. at 372.
" See id. at 370-72.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
" Id. at 621-25.
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In the cases in which the Supreme Court has invoked this danger as a
reason for invalidating legislation, the aid has been limited and often
minimal. 99 Notably, the very same potential for the fostering of religion
or irreligion exists in public schools.
Neutrality or Bias
Governmental neutrality between religions, and between religion and
irreligion is violated by "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvemezit of the sovereign (government) in religious activity."'0 0 Never-
theless contemporary educational policy in the United States amounts to
government sponsorship and financial subsidization of secularism as op-
posed to traditional religion. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[s]pecial tax benefits. . . cannot be squared with the principle of neu-
trality established by . . . this Court."' 01 Contrary to this admonition,
government gives not only "special tax benefits" but a complete monop-
oly of tax benefits to secularistic education. Considering that a simple
loan of secular instructional materials and equipment to church-related
schools is said to be unconstitutional, 10 2 how can full, exclusive govern-
mental financing of public schools that inculcate secularist religion or ir-
religion be constitutional?
Surveillance
The Supreme Court repeatedly has maintained that government can-
not be assured that teachers in church-related schools will not inculcate
religion, even when they are teaching secular subjects, using secular
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233 (1977) (books, instructional materials,
testing, diagnostic and therapeutic services, and field trip transportation); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 352-54 (1975) (auxiliary services, textbook loans, and instructional ma-
terial); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 763-65 (1973) (maintenance of
facilities, tuition reimbursement, and tax rebates); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413
U.S. 472, 474 (1973) (reimbursement for testing); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07
(1971) (reimbursement for teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials).
100 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). In Walz, an owner of real estate in
Richmond County, New York, sought an injunction to prevent religious ogranizations from
receiving certain property exemptions under the New York State Constitution. Id. at 666;
see N.Y. CoNsT. art. 16, § 1. The Court interpreted the State Constitution as not attempting
to establish a particular religion but as "simply sparing the exercise of religion from the
burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions." 397 U.S. at 673. The
Court noted that even if the tax exemption did not establish, sponsor, or support religion,
an inquiry was still necessary to determine that its effect is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Id. at 674. The Court concluded that no such entanglement
existed. Id. at 680.
'' Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973).
'o' See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975).
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materials, and conscientiously trying to avoid such indoctrination."°3 For
this reason, the Court has insisted that strict and intensive governmental
surveillance would be required to avoid such a possibility if any govern-
ment aid were given to church-related schools or to teachers therein. The
Court has indicated that "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restric-
tions are obeyed.' 0 4 In many cases effective surveillance to guard against
such inculcation will be impossible, since teachers can often indirectly in-
culcate faith and morals.
The same surveillance that is supposedly necessary in church-related
schools is also required in public schools where teachers can and often do
inseminate attitudes, values, and standards that are essentially religious
or irreligious. Obviously such strict "comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing surveillance" is not currently practiced in public schools and
would be impossible to implement.
Miscellaneous Observations of the Court
The Supreme Court has noted and invoked as a partial reason for its
decisions "the divisive political potential" in legislating governmental as-
sistance to church-related schools. 05 Notably, however, there is also a
"divisive social potential" threatening the family as a fundamental social
unit if government does not aid church-related schools. In public schools
there is a real danger that children will be directly or indirectly indoctri-
nated with attitudes, values, and standards that are contrary to those
cherished and conveyed by their parents, thus gravely impacting on the
family unit. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that pupils in
church-related schools, such as parochial schools, are of "an impressiona-
103 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971). The Court declared that "[w]e need
not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any
conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by. . . the First Amendment." Id. at 618.
Nonetheless, the Court maintained that states "must be certain, given the Religion Clauses,
that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion .... " Id. at 619; see Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977) (therapists may transmit ideological views to students); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975) (impermissible conduct by a teacher may be less in a
remedial math class than in a history class, but it still exists); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (teachers preparing examinations may inculcate students in
religious precepts).
104 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
105 Id. at 622-23. As noted by the Court in Lemon, whenever a church-related school serves
a large number of students, "it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable
political activity." Id. at 622. Supporters of parochial education will utilize political activity
to gain financial support for church-related schools. Id. Likewise, opponents of state aid to
church-related schools will utilize political activity to prevent such aid. Id. Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that "political division along religious lines was one of the principle evils
against which the first amendment was intended to protect." Id.
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ble age," and hence extremely sensitive to influences regarding beliefs and
values such as faith and morals.106 Children of the same age in public
schools are equally impressionable and susceptible to mind-forming influ-
ences divergent from those of their family and church.
THE CASE OF Wisconsin v. Yoder
The Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,10 7 has accepted and af-
firmed the value-laden nature of public education, and has agreed that it
conflicts with at least one traditional religion-the Amish faith. 0 8 The
Amish, who in pursuit of early Christian ideals prefer to live in simple,
agrarian communities, accepted the compulsory education law of the
State of Wisconsin as far as it applied to "eight grades of elementary
basic education imparted in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large pro-
portion of students of the Amish faith."' 0 9 They refused, however, to send
their children to public high schools "often remote from the student's
home and alien to his daily home life."' 10 When the state attempted to
compel certain Amish parents to send their children to high school, the
parents were convicted and penalized by a lower Wisconsin court.1 ' The
defense of the Amish parents was that they did not consider high school
attendance necessary to their way of life, and that attendance at a public
high school would tend to alienate their children from their religion and
threaten the religion's survival." 2 Both the Wisconsin and United States
'o Id. at 616.
107 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"o See id. at 217-18. The Supreme Court noted in Yoder that the state has a significant
responsibility in educating its citizens. Id. at 213. "Providing public schools," the Court
stated, "ranks at the very apex of the functions of a State." Id. The Court observed that the
difficulty, however, is that the state's interest in "universal education" must be balanced
against first amendment rights. Id.
1o Id. at 217. The Amish agree that the first eight grades are necessary in order to teach
their children the basic skills to read the Bible, to farm, and to deal with non-Amish people.
Id. at 212. Often to secure these skills, the Amish established their own elementary schools.
Id. It is the Amish belief that a basic education "does not significantly expose their children
to worldly values or interfere with their development in the Amish community during the
crucial adolescent period." Id.
Id. at 217. The Amish objected to education beyond the eighth grade because of the
emphasis on competition in school work along with other related peer pressures. Id. at 211.
During the critical adolescent period students are removed from their community both
"physically and emotionally." Id. As noted by the Court, "high school attendance with
teachers who are not of the Amish faith-and may even be hostile to it-interposes a seri-
ous barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious community." Id.
at 211-12.
.. Id. at 207-08.
12 See supra note 110.
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Supreme Courts upheld the Amish contention,1" stating that to force the
parents to send their children to public high school would be a violation
of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.114
Like the Amish, Catholics, Lutherans, Christian Reformists, Ortho-
dox Jews, and others, who operate their own schools at great sacrifice,
maintain firmly imbedded religious convictions. Their concern about the
dangers to the religious faith and morals of their children and their fears
for the survival of their religion are as heartfelt as those of the Amish." 5
CONCLUSION
Secularism or secular humanism is a world outlook and attitude to-
ward life-a "religion" in both a general and legal sense. It repudiates
traditional religion and religion-based morality and implicitly denies the
existence of God. Public education inculcates general outlooks and values,
as does all education, but the modern reality is that these values are en-
tirely secular and devoid of the concepts and values of traditional reli-
gion. When government denies a share of public subsidization to accred-
ited church-related schools, but supplies the same in full measure to
public schools, it discriminates against traditional religion. Thus, the gov-
ernment violates both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the
first amendment, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and infringes upon other basic human freedoms meant to be
safeguarded by the Constitution. A result of this practice may be the de-
cline of traditional religion and, ultimately, a national religion of
secularism.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that government may
not prefer one religion over others, nor prefer religion or irreligion over its
opposite. This does not mean that government may not simultaneously
aid all of these equally and without discrimination.
A constitutionally acceptable solution would be nondiscriminatory
governmental subsidization to students in all accredited schools, thus
treating secularism and traditional religion equally. True government
neutrality and genuine observance of the Constitution demand that gov-
ernment subsidize various types of schools, religious as well as secularist.
11 406 U.S. at 234.
'4 Id. The Court concluded that forcing the Amish people to send their children to secular
high schools not only would endanger their free exercise of religion, but could eventually
destroy it. Id. at 219.
'5 For applications of the Yoder decision, see Church of God v. Amarillo Indep. School
Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613, 618 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (limiting the number of excused absences for
religious holy days deemed unconstitutional), aff'd per curiam, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982),
and Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270, 275-76 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (compulsory attendance in
coeducational gym classes, which violated religious belief, held invalid).
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While this Article maintains that American public education is support-
ive of secularism, it is neither hostile to nor critical of public education.
For those students and parents who prefer secularism and its corollaries,
or are not opposed to secularist education and its fruits, or do not care to
have traditional religious attitudes and habits inculcated on a daily basis,
public education is acceptable. Public education has provided and will
continue to provide most valuable public services in this country. This
Article is opposed solely to the exclusive governmental subsidization of
education that inculcates secularism. A system which subsidizes schools
that inculcate traditional religion on a basis similar to that accorded secu-
larist education would not only ensure the survival of church-related edu-
cational institutions, but also would be the most equitable and demo-
cratic, as well as the most constitutional system of public funding for
education.
